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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This case of first impression seeks to remedy Google’s unfair and deceptive policies and 
practices in targeting e-ventures instead of the content on the 366 e-ventures websites removed from 
Google’s search results. According to Google, its 740+ page public-facing webmaster guidelines 
(the “Guidelines”) nebulously suggest to webmasters (i.e., owners of websites) on how to get 
websites on Google’s search results – and stay there.  
The Guidelines provide even more obscure suggestions on how Google can designate a 
website as “pure spam.” That designation effectively deletes the website from Google’s search 
index (i.e., the Internet). If a Google user searches for the removed website on google.com, that 
website will never again show up on Google (unless Google changes its mind – which Google 
publicly acknowledges is “rare”). Rafferty Decl., Ex. 24 at 2. The “pure spam” designation is a 
death sentence. That is what Google did to e-ventures. Google relies on hindsight to shift focus 
from what it actually did (target e-ventures) to what it should have done (review content). 
e-ventures is not a n of websites. It was a very real business. It made millions of 
dollars. And it employed numerous Florida residents. In and prior to 2014, e-ventures maintained 
independent websites providing online publishing and advertising services. In its simplistic form, e-
ventures provides rankings of companies in certain verticals similar to how Consumer Reports® 
provides product ratings and reviews. e-ventures’ clients pay e-ventures to be reviewed and ranked 
on e-ventures’ rating lists for certain verticals. That’s the same thing Google does to make money: 
provide advertising space. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22, RFA 1-2, 38. e-ventures’ clients paid a premium 
to be ranked by e-ventures because e-ventures’ websites were highly ranked on Google’s organic 
search results (i.e., a virtual billboard) – typically among the most valuable results (if not, the first 
result). In short, e-ventures’ websites were found immediately beneath Google’s AdWords 
advertisements – the precious listings by which Google generated nearly $60 billion in revenue in 
REDACT
ED
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2014. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22, RFA 41; Ex. 26 at #6. 
 To be clear, however, e-ventures was a real threat to Google. Because each dollar earned by 
e-ventures was a dollar not earned by Google. This is because e-ventures specialized in ranking 
companies in the search engine optimization (“SEO”) vertical. The companies in the SEO vertical 
drive revenue away from Google because they facilitate a website’s higher placement on Google’s 
organic search results. That results in more money driven away from Google’s bread and butter 
AdWords program. For that reason, e-ventures competes with Google, which targets SEOs because 
they threaten Google’s $60 billion money train. That is why Google fought so hard against 
producing its secret “hit list” of SEO companies to e-ventures.  
Google’s arguments fall flat. The First Amendment and the CDA do not apply to these facts.  
Google engaged in anti-competitive behavior by maliciously targeting e-ventures (not content) 
based on Google’s malicious belief e-ventures was an SEO. First, contrary to Google’s overtures, 
Google did not remove e-ventures’ websites for content reasons or based on editorial judgments. 
Put simply, to be an editor, you have to review content. And Google could not exercise “editorial 
judgment” on content it did not read. Beyond that, the record establishes factual issues of whether 
Google did, in fact, review the content on each of the 366 websites containing  
during its less than . Second, this Court already recognized that anti-
competitive motives are not protected by the First Amendment in its ruling denying Google’s 
motion to dismiss. Likewise, bad faith is not protected by the CDA. Being prototypical questions of 
fact, at a minimum, bad faith and motive must be decided by the jury. The undisputed facts 
establish that Google (i) did not review the content on each of the  of e-ventures’ 
websites prior to removal, (ii)  
 
 and (ii) removed the websites, after 
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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.  
Google’s anti-competitive motives are further evident from Google’s secret “investigatory” 
documents. Notably, the  
 
 
. Falls Tr. 113:21-24; 114:4-7; 
Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9 (2042.R).  
 
 Falls Tr. 
82:2-12; 115:5-8.  
. Falls Tr. 120:11-19.  
Returning to that external anonymous e-mail “tip,” Mr. Falls received that “tip” on 
September 15, 2014, 09:48 [PST]. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 10; Google Tr. 79:13-17 (  
).  
. That tip contained a 
copy of e-ventures’ customer list. Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 19, 50; see also Falls Declaration, 
12/1/16, Ex. 15 (ECF 138-16). Yet, Mr. Falls never  
 
 Compare Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9 (GOOG_EVTS_00002013-2026) with Ex. 10.  
To mask its anti-competitive motive and bad faith, Google relies on post-hoc justifications. 
Not surprisingly, Google’s reconsideration request process (the process to get websites back on the 
Internet after Google removes them) did not particularize the clear reasons for removal. e-ventures 
Tr. 163:15; 164:18-20. That is because Google itself had no idea which of the  of e-
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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ventures’ websites violated which guideline. As a result, e-ventures was forced to take remedial 
measures in a desperate and scrambled effort to be re-indexed, so it could salvage what remained of 
its business. e-ventures Tr. 164:23-25; 165:4-12; 169:4-6. The subsequent changes e-ventures made 
to its websites were prompted by Google’s so-called suggestions, and are equivalent to coerced-
compliant false confessions. Moreover, these so-called “admissions” are not admissible, let alone 
negate that factual issues of Google’s targeting e-ventures and not content.1  
Google intended to interfere with e-ventures’ business relationships.  
 
 
 
 Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11. If 
 
 
 Rafferty Decl., Ex. 12.    
To add insult to injury, in conjunction with filing reconsideration requests, e-ventures paid 
Google to advertise its banned websites through its AdWords Program in order to mitigate the 
damage done to its customer base. e-ventures Tr. 156:14-18; Trika Decl. ¶8; Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., 
                                                
1 Furthermore, e-ventures’ filing reconsideration requests demonstrates the absence of “pure spam,” not guilt as Google 
would have the Court believe. According to Matt Cutts, Google’s former head of webspam, "it’s rare for people to 
actually file reconsideration requests for sites that are classified as pure spam, because many webmasters approach them 
as churn and burn." Rafferty Decl., Ex. 24 at 2 (emphasis added). Google admittedly restored several of e-venture’s 
websites despite Mr. Cutts’ caution that “pure spam is probably one of the more difficult spam flags to overcome.” Id. at 
3. That Google revoked its “pure spam” penalties, so quickly after being removal, is evidence of anti-competitive 
motive and bad faith conduct, namely that the removal was company-based and not content-based. That is because, as 
Mr. Cutts says, usually pure spam websites are “churn and burn,” so Google became concerned about liability when e-
ventures sought reconsideration. According to a Mr. Cutts declaration in another case, spam “refers to pages from the 
World Wide Web.” Rafferty, Decl., Ex. 18, ¶ 2. He also provides a useful example: “a page containing pornographic 
material that attempted to show up as a result to a search for ‘Disney Cartoons’ would be considered webspam.” Id. 
There is no evidence that each page of e-ventures’ 366 websites contained pure spam, or that Google reviewed each 
website page. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Google removed those websites because of e-ventures, and not because 
of any content on e-ventures’ websites. 
 
REDACTED
REDACTED
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 146   Filed 12/15/16   Page 10 of 33 PageID 1824
	  	   5 
RFA 4-5. Curiously, e-ventures’ websites were not good enough for Google’s free search results, 
but .  
In addition to the factual issues for the jury, Google is not entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law for four reasons. First, the CDA does not apply to Lanham Act or FDUPTA claims, 
and its plain language provides immunity only for actions, not present here, “voluntarily taken in 
good faith” for objectionable content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) and (c)(2)(A). Second, Google’s 
conduct is not entitled to First Amendment protection because Google was motivated by anti-
competitive reasons: targeting e-ventures, not content on its websites, particularly after receiving e-
ventures’ customer list. By removing e-ventures’ websites from its search results, Google falsely 
represented to the world that e-ventures’ websites are pure spam. Third, Google’s deceptive and 
misleading statements caused e-ventures substantial harm, and deceived e-ventures’ own consumers 
into believing e-ventures went out of business, under FDUTPA. Fourth, Google tortiously interfered 
e-ventures’ relationships by intentionally damaging them after getting e-ventures’ customer list. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
A.   GOOGLE’S GUIDELINES  
. e-ventures Tr. 
132:10-11; 133:1-6, 16-22; 146; 22-25; Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 13.  
. Falls Tr. 29:13-14, 16-24; Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 20.  
. e-ventures Tr. 
133:4-6. And, the Guidelines are not exhaustive. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22 at RFA 15. While Google 
has  see Google Tr. 94:23-24, the Guidelines state that websites (not 
“networks”) are only removed if they contain “pure spam.” Rafferty Dec., Ex. 24. Google publicly 
advises website owners that “pure spam is reserved for the spammiest of websites.” Id. Duplicate 
content on your site does not mean penalization. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 25 at 2-3 (#duplicate-content). 
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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B.   GOOGLE’S SPAM TEAM TARGETS E-VENTURES BECAUSE 
  
 
Google targets SEOs.  Google 
Tr. 70:8; 153:4-6.  
Google Tr. 65:12-15; White Tr. 81:12-13.  
 
 Google Tr. 66:20-67:7.  
 Google 
Tr. 68:3-6.  
 
 Falls Tr. 111:22-24; 113:14-
15; Rafferty Decl. 9 at 2042R-2054R ( ).  
The Guidelines suggest only that “sites” may be removed; nowhere do the Guidelines 
disclose that a “network” could be removed for guilt-by-association reasons. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22 
at Ex. A. Yet, that is exactly what Mr. Falls did. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22 at ¶9 (“we acted upon the 
entire network of websites to efficiently use Google’s resources”). And, because e-ventures’ 
“network” of websites were removed without prior disclosure in the Guidelines, that leads more 
credence to the fact that e-ventures was targeted – not the content on its websites. 
C.   GOOGLE SPENDS  
 
Google cannot get its story straight. On the one hand, in its moving papers, Google says 
each website was reviewed. But, just six months ago, Google admitted to reviewing only “numerous 
individual websites.” Rafferty Dec., Ex. 23 at 17. Following that up, “Google intended its removal 
actions not just to focus on particular sites but on e-ventures’ entire network [and] Google took 
action against the network as a whole for several reasons” because Google wanted “to prevent e-
ventures from migrating problematic content from removed to unremoved websites.” Id. (emphasis 
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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added). Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 27. That rationale strains credulity: if each website violated the 
Guidelines, then Google should not have had to justify removing e-ventures’ network. Yet, in 
another flip flop, two years before that, Mr. Falls declared under penalty of perjury that Google 
acted upon e-ventures’ entire network of websites to “efficiently use Google’s resources.” Falls 
Decl. ¶ 39 (emphasis added); Rafferty Dec., Ex. 22, RFA 25.  
Further indicia of targeting e-ventures (instead of concentrating on content), Mr. Falls 
. 
Falls Tr. 63:9-12.  
 Google Tr. 70:8; 153:4-6.  
Falls Tr. 24:11-12.  
 Google 
Tr. 45:8-16.  
 
 Falls Tr. 51:25.  
Falls Tr. 40:3-4. 
.2 Falls Tr. 
39:19; 72:25. . Falls Tr. 47:8-23; 
48:1-8. With good reason, he was caught. e-ventures’ 366 websites contain  
). Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9 (1997.R – 2009.R). To review that number of websites 
and pages in , Mr. Falls would have had to  
                                                
2  
 
. 
REDACTED
REDACTED
RE
DA
CT
ED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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. What makes that even more unbelievable is that 
Google claims e-ventures’  
 Falls Tr. 31:2-12; 95:17-23; 101:2-10; 
105:3-5; 131:5-16; 144:18-24; 146:18-23; 199:22-200:24; 217:20-24; 218:4-9. To confirm that, Mr. 
Falls would have had to compare the content on one site with that of another, thereby doubling the 
amount of work needed in that limited window of time –  
 See supra at 7, n.1; infra at 10-11 Mr. Falls testified that  
 Falls Tr. 
105:3-5. That does not leave much time for Mr. Falls to confirm  
There are 600 minutes in 10 hours.  
 
 Google Tr. 55:2-4. Falls 
Tr. 95:19-21.   
 Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9. Mr. Falls was on vacation 
September 1 through September 5, 2014. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 15.  
 
Falls. Tr. 89:7; 83:11; 56:4 (emphasis added).  
 
 
Google Tr. 88:6-22.  
The date of the external e-mail “tip” was September 15, 2014. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 10.  On 
September 15, 2014, in direct response to the “tip”, Mr. Falls e-mailed  
 Rafferty Decl., 
Ex. 11. On September 17, 2014, Mr. Falls subsequently 
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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 Rafferty Decl., Ex. 10.   
 
. Falls Tr. 
105:25; 106:1; 108:23-25; 109:1-4; Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9.   
 
 
. Google Tr. 140:14-21; 142:20-25; 143:3-6.  
 Google Tr. 141:6-
13. 
 Falls Tr. 91:2-7.  
 Google Tr. 141:14-16, 22; Falls Tr. 91:15-17; White Tr. 61:24-25; 62:1-2.  
 
. Falls Decl. ¶39.  
D.   GOOGLE FAILS TO    
Google admitted that  
 Google Tr. 110:18-21. Without question, Mr. Falls never  
 Falls Tr. 
93:18-20; 94:1-4,10-11. Had he done so, he would know about Google’s  
 
Rafferty Decl., Ex. 19 (GOOG_EVTS00000977) 
 
. 
REDACTED REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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White Tr. 112:5-11.  
 Google Tr. 38:13, 22; 42:13, 10-12, 19; 43:3. “  
Google Tr. 31:6-8. 
. 
Google Tr. 200:3-4; 201:7-12.  
 Google Tr. 217:8-12. 
 
 Google Tr. 40:25; 
41:1-2; 42:11-12.  
 White Tr. 90:1-4.  
 
Google Tr. 95:10-19.  
 White Tr. 117:25; 
118:1-3; Kwok Tr. 38:23-25; 39:1.  
Google Tr. 95:5-7.  
Google Tr. 93:25; 94:1-6.  
 
. Google Tr. 101:2-4; White Tr. 90:1-4.  
Trika Tr. 152:2-17.  
 
Google Tr. 145:24-25; 146:2-5; 
Falls Tr. 86:2-3; White Tr. 87:22-23, 88:14-15,23; Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11.  
 
 
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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. Falls Tr. 63:18-23; 64:17-22; 65:3-4. 
 
 
. Falls Tr. 65:20-21; 73:12-20.  
. Falls Tr. 73:12-16. 
 
. White Tr. 48:7-8, 18-20.  
 
Falls Tr. 33:14-21. 
. Google Tr. 
102:19-21.  
, see Google Tr. 52:14-25,  
 see Google Tr. 55:5-15,  
: 
Google Tr. 101:17-21.  
 
Google Tr. 134:22-135:1. 
 
 Instead of testifying as to facts supporting the removal, Google copped out:  
Google Tr. 134:22-135:1.  
’ 
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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.3 White Tr. 95:4-7, 15; 117:11-24; Kwok 34:17-21. That is because Mr. Falls did not 
follow the . Rafferty Decl., Ex. 19, GOOG_EVTS00000977.4 
E.   E-VENTURES DOES WHATEVER GOOGLE TOLD IT TO REVOKE PURE SPAM  
 . White Tr. 
98:14-17.  
 
. White Tr. 101:4-7.  
 
. White Tr.101:15-19, 20-23; Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9 (2042.R).  
. 
Rafferty Decl., Ex. 19.  
. White Tr. 102:10-13.  
 Google did not provide any explanation as to why e-ventures’ websites were delisted. Trika 
Decl. ¶¶16,18; Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 32.   
 
 Tr. 163:15; 164:18-20.  
 
178:8-13.   
                                                
3  
oogle Tr. 209:7-11; 210:7-15; 212:20-23.  
Google Tr. 206:22-24; 207:1; 212:3-7.  
 
oogle Tr. 206:22-24; 207:1. 
 
4
 
 
-ventures Tr. 151:17-25; 152:1-2, 14-16. 
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 Tr. 164:23-25; 165:4-12; 169:4-6.  
 
. Trika Tr. 163:3-7,12-14.  
.” Trika Tr. 146:8-
10; 147:12-14.  
 
 Id.; e-ventures Tr. 169:14-15; Trika Decl. ¶5.  
e-ventures’ disclosed expert in this case, Jeremey Paton, testified that  
 Rafferty Dec., Ex. 7 at 7 § 4; Paton Tr. 260:5-6. Google missed the 
deadline to disclose an expert to discredit Mr. Paton’s opinion. Rafferty Decl. ¶28.  
F.   CAUSATION AND DAMAGES  
Prior to removal, Mr. Falls was keenly aware of e-ventures’ contractual relationships that 
depended on the websites’ positions on Google’s search engine:  
 
Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11.   
. Google Tr. 
144:18-19, 25; Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11. . Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11. 
                                                
5 Moreover, during the ban, e-ventures launched a “test website,” (www.bwdanews.com), which simply included the 
text: “ByeBye World.” Trika Decl. ¶9. Incredibly, according to Google, those two words constitute “pure spam”; so it 
removed that site within hours.  Trika Decl. ¶9. 
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. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 17.  Revenue plummeted and visitor traffic significantly 
dropped. Trika Decl. ¶¶16, 25.  e-ventures Tr. 24:17-21. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Courts should act with caution in granting summary judgments. See Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Because summary judgment is a “drastic device,” cutting off 
a party’s right to present its case to a jury, the moving party bears a “heavy burden” of 
demonstrating the absence of any triable issue of material fact. See Nationwide Life Ins. v. Bankers 
Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2nd Cir. 1999).   
I.   GOOGLE IS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY UNDER THE CDA 
 
The legislative history confirms that the CDA was to protect children from sexually explicit 
content. In his statement introducing the proposed legislation, Senator Exon proclaimed, “[T]he 
information superhighway should not become a red light district. This legislation will keep that 
from happening and extent the standards of decency which have protected telephone users to new 
telecommunications devices.” 141 Cong. Rec. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Exon). The statute also explains that its passage was prompted by a desire to encourage the 
development of “filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material.” 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(4).  
A.   CDA DOES NOT APPLY TO LANHAM ACT OR FDUPTA CLAIMS  
The CDA does not apply to claims brought under the Lanham Act or FDUPTA. Section 
230(e)(2) states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(2). Section §230(e)(3) of the CDA does not 
bar e-ventures’ FDUPTA claim: “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State 
from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(2). Federal 
REDACTED
REDACTED
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courts routinely enforce those provisions. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Bleeping Computer 
LLC, 2016 WL 3773394 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, 
Inc., No. 00 Civ 71544, 2001 WL 1176319, at *1 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 25, 2001); Almedia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006). 
B.   SECTION 230(C)(1) OF THE CDA DOES NOT APPLY  
Section 230(c)(1) does not “create a lawless no-man’s-land on the internet. Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 
2008). Rather, it protects from liability only (a) a provider or user of an interactive computer service 
(b) that the plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker (c) of information provided by another 
information content provider. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Section 230(c)(1) (Stating only that: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”), 
In assessing a Section 230(c)(1) defense, “what matters is…whether the cause of action 
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the publisher or speaker of content 
provided by another.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101–02 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
added). “[C]ourts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives 
from the defendant's status or conduct as a publisher or speaker.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Court in Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., 2016 WL 3660526, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2016) provides 
an instructive analogy: 
If someone delivers newspapers containing false gossip, and the person who is the subject 
of the gossip sues the delivery person for defamation, that lawsuit seeks to treat the 
delivery person as a publisher. But if the delivery person throws an unwanted newspaper 
noisily at a door early in the morning, and the homeowner sues the delivery person for 
nuisance, that suit doesn’t seek to treat the delivery person as a publisher. The suit doesn’t 
care whether the delivery person is throwing a newspaper or a rock, and the suit certainly 
doesn’t care about the content of the newspaper. It does not involve the delivery person’s 
“reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication 
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 146   Filed 12/15/16   Page 21 of 33 PageID 1835
	  	   16 
third party content.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102. Nor is the lawsuit asking a court to impose 
“liability arising from content.” Roommate.com, 521 F.3d at 1162. It merely seeks to stop 
the nuisance. 
  
Id.  Here, e-ventures is not seeking to treat Google as the “publisher or speaker” of information 
provided by e-ventures (or any third party).  There is no third party content at issue in this case and 
e-ventures is not arguing that Google’s liability is based on information provided by e-ventures on 
e-ventures’ websites.  Rather, e-ventures claims are based on Google’s anti-competitive conduct, 
which was in contravention of Google’s own statements to the public.  Defendants are not 
permitted to avoid liability for their own deceptive statements or unlawful conduct under Section 
230(c)(1), which is what Google seeks to do here.  
Thus, the issue is not that an e-ventures’ website stated “Bye Bye World,” for example, the 
issue is that Google told the public that it would not remove these types of websites, and then 
Google did it anyway, for anti-competitive reasons. Google’s “investigation” of e-ventures websites 
started and ended . The “tip” email, and Google’s receipt of e-ventures’ 
customer list, , are compelling facts exposing Google’s anti-competitive 
motive in removing e-ventures’ websites just days later without further investigation. See Nunes, 
2016 WL 3660526 at *1 (denying summary judgment under the CDA). 
Wrongfully removing websites for the purpose of decreasing competition and increasing 
advertising revenues does not fall within the traditional editorial functions of a publisher.  This is 
particularly true because there is no evidence supporting any notion that Google even reviewed the 
content of every website prior to removal.  As competitors, Google and e-ventures seek revenue 
from the same individuals looking for prime advertising placement on the internet. Yet, the cases to 
which Google cites merely describe the exercise of that function (i.e. the decision whether to 
publish or remove content) without regard to the purpose a given publisher might make for such a 
decision.  
REDACTED
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The jury must assess Google’s credibility, and scrutinize the anti-competitive motives, 
behind Google’s exercise of “editorial” functions as a façade to decrease competition under Section 
230(c)(1) without reviewing content.  It must further determine whether removing e-ventures’ 
“network” of sites for efficiency reasons – something not disclosed in the Guidelines – evidences 
anti-competitive conduct and bad faith. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 21, ¶39 (“we acted upon the entire 
network of websites to efficiently use Google’s resources”) (emphasis added). On that point, there 
would be no reason for Mr. Falls to act “efficiently” against the “network” on September 18, 2014, 
if he already determined that each website page had violated the Guidelines.  
C.   SECTION 230(C)(2) OF THE CDA DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE QUESTIONS OF FACT 
EXISTS AS TO GOOGLE’S GOOD FAITH 
 
Good faith is a question of fact incapable of resolution on summary judgment. Google 
lacked good faith under the CDA since it did not review the content on each e-ventures website 
prior to removal and removed those websites immediately after receiving e-ventures’ customer list. 
More glaring is Mr. Falls’ blatant disregard of the  – which establishes 
an ulterior, bad faith motive. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 20, GOOG_EVTS00000977. 
Section 230(c)(2) provides a shield from liability only for “any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider . . . considers to be 
obscene . . . or otherwise objectionable.” Section 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 230 is 
captioned “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,” which 
indicates that Congress was focused on potentially offensive materials, not simply materials 
undesirable to a content provider or user. 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c) (emphasis added); Song fi, Inc. 
v. Google, Inc., 108 F.Supp.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2015); see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–
60 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Section 230(c) in light of this caption); see also Fair Housing 
Council, 521 F.3d at 116364 (citing Doe and a subsequent Seventh Circuit decision with approval);  
see also Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (declining “to broadly 
REDACTED
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interpret ‘otherwise objectionable’ material to include any or all information or content.”).  
A question of fact exists as to whether e-ventures’ websites contained “objectionable” 
content. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida has held that 
“objectionable” content must, at a minimum, involve or be similar to pornography, graphic 
violence, obscenity, or harassment. Nat’l Numismatic Cert., LLC v. eBay, Inc., 2008 WL 2704404, 
at*25 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2008). Other federal courts have aligned with the eBay court. The Ninth 
Circuit expressed concern that such an “unbounded” reading of “otherwise objectionable” would 
enable content providers to “block content for anticompetitive purposes or merely at its malicious 
whim, under the cover of considering such material ‘otherwise objectionable.’” See Zango, Inc. v. 
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fisher, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
The statutory immunity provided for under the CDA “does not apply without limitation.” Almeida, 
456 F.3d at 1321-22 (citing 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(1)). A jury must decide what is already known – e-
ventures’ websites did not contain any pornography, graphic violence, obscenity or harassment.  
This Court should follow the Middle District of Florida’s decision in eBay, Inc. There, the 
plaintiffs sued eBay for reputational harm allegedly inflicted when eBay removed their coin auction 
times for violations of eBay’s Counterfeit Currency and Stamp Policy. Id., 2008 WL 2704404, at*6.  
Like Google does here, eBay argued immunity based on its public-facing policy of removing 
“objectionable” material under Section 230(c)(2). Id. The eBay court called, as the Court should 
here, defendant’s immunity argument “unsound,” because the content removed by eBay did not “at 
a minimum involve or be similar to pornography, graphic violence, obscenity, or harassment.” Id. at 
*25. There is not even a shred of evidence of objectionable material on any e-ventures’ website. 
Google would not know that, however, because it did not review content prior to removal.  
Likewise, content analysis – something Google did not do – is a prerequisite to immunity 
under the CDA. The Court in Sherman concluded, as this Court should here, that Section 230(c)(2), 
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the “good Samaritan” immunity, is inapplicable where Yahoo! did not engage in any form of 
content analysis of the subject text to identify material that was offensive or harmful prior to the 
automatic sending of a notification message. Sherman, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. Furthermore, just 
last year, the Ninth Circuit held that traffic to a website is not a valid basis for Google’s immunity 
under the CDA. In Song fi, Google removed a music video entitled “Luv ya” due to an inflated view 
count allegedly violating Google’s terms of service. Song fi, 108 F.Supp.3d at 880. Google argued 
there, as it does here, that something other than content – increased traffic – is “otherwise 
objectionable” within the meaning of Section 230(c)(2) of the CDA. Id. at 882. The Court 
summarily rejected that argument, analyzing that neither the plain meaning of “otherwise 
objectionable,” nor the context, purpose, or history of the CDA, allows Google to stretch the reach 
of the CDA to bounds not contemplated by Congress. Id.  
Google’s overreaching here is likewise outside the scope of the CDA. Citing to the United 
States Supreme Court ruling in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001), the 
Song fi court reasoned, as this Court should here, that when a statute provides a list of examples 
followed by a catchall term (or “residual clause”) like “otherwise objectionable,” the preceding list 
provides a clue as to what the intent of the statute. Song fi, 108 F.Supp.3d. at 883.  The Song fi court 
stated that given the list of terms preceding “otherwise objectionable,” – “obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, [and] harassing ...” – it is hard to imagine that the phrase includes, as 
Google urges, the allegedly artificially inflated view count associated with “Luv ya.” Id. The Court 
added that even if it can “see why artificially inflated view counts would be a problem for ... 
YouTube and its users,” the terms preceding “otherwise objectionable” suggest Congress did not 
intend to immunize YouTube from liability for removing materials from its website simply 
Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM   Document 146   Filed 12/15/16   Page 25 of 33 PageID 1839
	  	   20 
because those materials pose a “problem” for YouTube. Id. (emphasis added).6 In short, 
YouTube’s removal and relocation of “Luv ya” was not the kind of self-regulatory editing and 
screening that Congress intended to immunize under the CDA. Id. at 884.  
  Similarly, Google’s after-the-removal conduct disqualifies summary judgment under the 
CDA.  In Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards, 2011 WL 900096 at *3, *8-9 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 
2011), the court denied summary judgment under the CDA where competing evidence questioned 
defendant’s good faith in allegedly blocking blocked e-mail for financial motive, namely to 
encourage the plaintiff to upgrade his service plan. Id. There, the court found, as this Court should 
here, that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant acted in bad faith and was not entitled to 
immunity under the CDA when it failed to respond to the plaintiff’s repeated requests for an 
explanation as to defendant’s conduct. Id., 2011 WL 900096 at *9. This Court should continue the 
favorable reliance on Smith, see Dkt. 86, at 13, by finding Google’s inability to provide, despite e-
ventures’ repeated requests after removal and in this case, the specific reason each website was 
removed or any evidence that it reviewed each website before removal. 
All in all, the CDA does not give Google blanket immunity.  First, e-ventures’ legitimate 
business content was not objectionable under the CDA. e-ventures’ websites did not contain 
pornographic or obscene content. Google Tr. 217:8-12. Google accuses e-ventures of “tricking” the 
search results but the Court has already held that artificially inflating a view count does not 
constitute objectionable content within the meaning of Section 230(c)(2). Song fi, 108 F.Supp.3d at 
882. Second, Mr. Fall’s evasive testimony, the investigatory gaps in the manual action tool log and 
the timing of the removal, which coincided with an uncorroborated external “tip” and the receipt of 
                                                
6 Courts around the country are in accord. See also Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 
17, 2008) (the relevant portions of Google’s Content Policy “relat[ing] to business norms of fair play and transparency 
are ... beyond the scope of § 230(c)(2)”); eBay, Inc., 2008 WL 2704404, at *25 (concluding, based in part on eiusdem 
generis, that Congress did not intend “otherwise objectionable” to refer to auction of potentially counterfeited coins). 
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e-ventures’ customer list, unearths Google’s bad faith. That is in addition to Mr. Falls’ going rogue 
by failing to  
.” Rafferty Decl., Ex. 19, GOOG_EVTS00000977. Lest, he 
apparently forgot, as the  requires, to ” and 
.” Id. 
The evidence establishes that (i) e  
White Tr. 112:5-11; (ii)  
 
 Google Tr. 31:6-8; 
38:13, 22; 42:10-13; 42:19-43:3; 101:17-21; 134:22-135:1; and (iii)  
 
Google Tr. 110:18-21.  
Google’s explanations are not plausible and lack credibility. Mr. Falls testified that e-
ventures’ alleged conduct  
Falls. Tr. 89:7; 83:11; see also Falls Tr. 56:4  
”). 
 
 
. White Tr. 61:19-22 (  
. Or, even better, an internal discussion about e-ventures’  
 
Falls. Tr. 17:4-5. Yet, Mr. Falls did not recall  
. Google Tr. 88:6-22.; 
Falls Tr. 91:2-7, 15-17; Google Tr. 141:14-16, 22; White Tr. 61:24-25; 62:1-2. The Court cannot 
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resolve Mr. Falls’ serious credibility issues on summary judgment. See Jenkins v. Anton, 2016 WL 
7180248, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2016)  (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the 
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences [] are jury functions, not those of a judge”). 
In addition to the lack of internal Google communication corroborating Mr. Falls’ self-
serving testimony to save his job, he testified  
. Yet, there is no corroborative 
documentary evidence – . Nor is it credible that 
he could have compared the content on 366 websites or  in the unaccounted  
 or found tens of thousands of scraped articles or hundreds of doorway domains 
in that period. Even more so, it calls into question whether Google was aware of the content 
scraping – at all – prior to removing e-ventures’ websites from Google’s search results. Even if 
Google could rely (which it cannot) on the inadmissible evidence of e-ventures’ reconsideration 
requests7 to establish alleged tens of thousands of scraped articles (  
8 it does nothing to prove 
Google’s good faith awareness and reliance on that information before removal. Thus, just as the 
court in Sherman held the CDA did not apply where Yahoo! did not engage in any form of content 
analysis, so too should this Court find that Google’s inability to present any evidence of content 
review or offensive content prior to removal does not support a CDA defense.9 
                                                
7 The court may properly refuse to consider any arguments or facts arising from e-ventures’ reconsideration requests to 
Google, or any conduct or statement relating to getting e-ventures’ websites back on Google, as remedial measures 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 407. See Hughes v. Stryker Corp., 423 Fed.Appx. 878, 880–81 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that the district court properly refused to consider a party's arguments related to a recall letter on a motion for summary 
judgment because it was inadmissible evidence under Rule 407).  
 
8  The court may not consider inadmissible hearsay on a motion for summary judgment. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 
683 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012). As a result, Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 24 to the Falls Declaration 
(ECF 138-1), and Exhibit 9 to the Willen Declaration (ECF 138-28), and any discussion thereon in Google’s brief, 
should be stricken.  
 
9 Google clings onto e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F.Supp.2d 605 (N.D. Ill 2008) to support its claim for 
immunity. But that case is distinguishable from the instant set of facts. There, e360Insight found that “a mistaken choice 
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II.   GOOGLE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
Google is not entitled to protection under the First Amendment. To further its arguments in 
cases like these, Google commissioned a White Paper, which concludes that search engines' 
immunity is virtually limitless – see Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, GOOGLE FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR SEARCH ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS, 24 Geo. Mason U. C.R.L.J. 89 
(2013). Interestingly, even in the White Paper Google commissioned, the authors note that the First 
Amendment only protects Google to the extent its decisions are motivated by content (absent here): 
To be sure, it is constitutionally permissible to stop a newspaper from 'forcing 
advertisers to boycott a competing' media outlet, when the newspaper refuses 
advertisements from advertisers who deal with the competitor. Lorain Journal 
Co. v.  United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152, 155 (1951). But the newspaper in Lorain 
Journal Co. was not excluding advertisements because of their content, in the 
exercise of some editorial judgment that its own editorial content was better than 
the proposed advertisements. Rather, it was excluding advertisements solely 
because the advertisers—whatever the content of their ads—were also advertising 
on a competing radio station. 
 
Volokh & Falk, id. at 22. 
As in Lorain Journal Co., Google did not block e-ventures' websites and advertisements 
because of their content. In fact, Google assures the public that it never removes websites for 
political, religious, or similar content-based reasons. Google blacklisted e-ventures for punitive, 
anticompetitive reasons, and removed e-ventures' websites and ads as part of that effort. Google did 
not even review all of the websites before removing them. Google did not document the violations 
pursuant to the Spam Documentation Policy, Google continued to run paid ads for some of the same 
(allegedly harmful) content, and some content remained the same before and after the websites and 
ads were delisted. In defining "pure spam" as – whatever Google wants to define "spam" as – 
Google is attempting to write itself a blank check allowing Google to punitively damage any party 
                                                
to block [the plaintiff’s emails], if made in good faith, cannot be the basis for liability.” Id. at 609. No mistake was 
made, here. 
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for whatever reason with impunity. But having taken action against e-ventures, not content, Google 
cannot credibly argue that it was just looking out for "relevance" for the benefit of its users. 
Google’s First Amendment argument is supported by inapposite case law and fails for the 
same reasons as the CDA. The decision in Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F.Supp.3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) is inapplicable because it was based on the pleadings and, unlike in Baidu, here: (i) Google's 
removals were not politically-motivated; (ii) Google's removals were not content-based, they were 
company-based; (iii) Google's removals were not accomplished through algorithms, but rather by 
Mr. Falls; and (iv) unlike Baidu.com, Google has monopoly power – when you search something on 
the Internet, you “Google it”. Id. Similarly, Search King v. Google, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. 
Okla. May 27, 2003) is not relevant because it did not involve paid ads or a discussion of 
commercial speech, and Search King only asserted one claim - intentional interference with 
contractual relations. Id. Lastly, the court should not follow Langdon v. Google, 2007 WL 530156 
(D.Del. Feb. 20, 2007) because that was a decision on a motion to dismiss. Id. Unlike Langdon, this 
case does not concern Google's rejection of objectionable ad content. The content of e-ventures' ads 
remained the same before and after the Google ban. e-ventures Tr. 169:14-15; Trika Decl. ¶5.  
III.   GOOGLE VIOLATED THE LANHAM ACT AND FDUPTA 
Google’s false representations amount to unfair competition pursuant to The Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) and violate FDUPTA. FDUPTA prohibits a deceptive act or unfair 
practice, which may be found where there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to 
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment. 
Advanced Protection Tech., Inc., v. Square D. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1165 (M.D.Fla. 2005) 
(Plaintiff’s misrepresenting defendant’s conduct of cloning and selling plaintiff’s product precluded 
summary judgment); Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).  
This Court should follow Mario Valente Collezioni Ltd v. AAK Limited, 280 F.Supp.2d 244, 
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256 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). There, the Court found that the defendant violated Section 1125(a)(1)(A) 
when it (i) attempted to sell the plaintiff’s product; (ii) represented that the plaintiff “had gone out 
of business or lost the label”; and (iii) damaged plaintiff’s relationship with buyers. Id. at 255-256.   
That is what happened here. Google knew e-ventures’ business depended on Google’s 
search results. After removal, . e-ventures Tr. 
156:14-18. Further, Google lied to the public, telling them that e-ventures had violated the 
Guidelines and, effectively, communicated that e-ventures had gone out of business. What shocks 
the conscience is that e-ventures’ allegedly “spammy” websites were not good enough to be on 
Google’s search results, but they good enough for AdWords. e-ventures Tr. 156:14-18; Google Tr. 
174:3-5; 178:22-25; 179:1. And e-ventures’ customers noticed. One of e-them stated that it 
“  
.” Rafferty Decl., Ex. 17 
(P000380).  
IV.   GOOGLE TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH E-VENTURES’ BUSINESS 
RELATIONSHIPS  
 
 “To determine whether interference is justified or privileged requires a commonsense 
consideration of whether the conduct was ‘sanctioned by the rules of the game’ and what is “right 
and just’ under the circumstances.” Bluesky Greenland Envtl. Solutions v. 21st Century Planet Fund, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170898, *27 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2013). 
. Google Tr. 144:18-19, 25; 
Rafferty Decl., Ex. 10; Falls Tr. 111:22-24; 113:14-15. Indeed, e-ventures’ continues to be 
damaged, and its profits and contractual relationships have been affected adversely. Rafferty Decl., 
Exs. 13, 16-17; e-ventures Tr. 24:17-21; Trika Decl. ¶¶ 9, 25.  
CONCLUSION 
The Court should deny Google’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
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